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ABSTRACT
The Presence of Adverse Selection in the 
Las Vegas Resale Housing Market
by
Ryan Matthew Bledsoe
Dr. Bradley S. Wiminer. Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor o f Economics 
University o f  Nevada. Las Vegas
Adverse selection may affect the resale housing market. Sellers hold valuable 
information concerning the quality o f  their homes that is not directly available to buyers. 
If buyers are unable to identify quality, the relocation decision is different for owners o f 
low and high-quality houses. Since information is asymmetric owners o f  low-qualit>' 
houses are more likely to relocate than owners o f high-quality houses, other things 
constant. Thus, I suggest that quality is decreasing in the number o f times a house has 
been resold. The presence o f a relationship behveen price and the number o f times a 
house has been resold is consistent with the hypothesis that adverse selection influences 
the resale housing market. My hedonic pricing model results supports this hypothesis. 
Moreover, as a house’s turnover rate increases, consumer’s willingness to pay for that 
house decreases, other things constant.
I l l
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric information between market participants may adversely affect market 
outcomes. When either buyer or seller possesses information about product quality that is 
not directly observable to both market participants, a reduction of mutually beneficial 
trades may occur. This reduction in trade can be attributed to adverse selection.
.According to Akerlof (1970), adverse selection results because “there is an incentive for 
sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good quality accrue 
mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather than the individual seller”
(488 1970) Informational discrepancies compel less-informed market participants to 
value the commodity at the expected value of goods offered for sale. With varying 
quality within a commodity class, adverse selection potentially drives high-quality goods 
out o f the market. This occurs when sellers of high-quality goods are unable to command 
their reservation price, since the presence o f low-quality goods decreases the expected 
value o f goods offered for sale. In contrast, sellers o f  low-quality goods are induced to 
sell their product since the market price exceeds their reservation prices. Therefore, other 
things equal, these low-quality goods are offered for sale more frequently than goods o f 
higher quality .
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The resale housing market has been analyzed extensively throughout the literature; 
however, potential adverse selection problems have not been addressed. An asymmetry 
o f information is likely to exist in this market. Thus, I attempt to identify if  adverse 
selection hinders the resale market for single-family residential homes. Owners possess 
superior information about their home quality relative to potential buyers. Through direct 
consumption o f housing serv ices, owners identify the quality o f their house’s amenities 
that are not revealed to prospective buyers. These amenities may include plumbing, 
wiring, foundation, environmental conditions, and neighborhood attributes. On the other 
hand, a prospective buyer would need to incur costs to get information. In m any cases 
this information w ould be expensive.
Since information is asymmetric, buyers are willing to pay a price consistent with the 
expected value o f  homes offered for sale. As such, reasons must exist for owners o f  high- 
quality houses to sell their good for a market to exist at all (Genesove, 1993). If  
relocation is not optimal for owners o f high-quality houses, then only low-quality houses 
are sold. In the resale housing market, some potential reasons for selling include 
occupational relocation, to change neighborhoods, the taking o f house price appreciation, 
and the desire to increase or decrease housing consumption as income or family size 
changes. The effects o f  adverse selection diminish when there is an increase in the 
percentage of sellers o f  high-quality houses that find relocation optimal. This allows 
even more high-quality products to be sold. However, high-quality goods sell for less 
than they would with perfect information.
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Asymmetric information induces owners o f  low-quality goods to sell their products, 
resulting in low-quality goods being sold more frequently. Conversely, the probability 
that a house is being sold o f a low quality, given it is offered for sale increases with the 
frequency o f resale. As  the number o f times a house is resold increases, consumers reduce 
their willingness to pay, other things constant. The presence o f  asymmetric information 
may result in adverse selection influencing market outcomes.
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CH.APTER 2
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE SELECTION 
IN THE RESALE HOUSING M.ARKET 
The following two examples identify potential housing market outcomes 
characterized by adverse selection. These cases rely heavily on restrictive assumptions, 
and they are presented for pedagogical purposes only rather than their realism or accurate 
portrayal o f the housing market. First, “bad houses drive out good,” is an outcome 
illustrative o f Gresham’s law. A second outcome is where mutually beneficial trades do 
not decrease, but the price received by sellers o f high-quality houses in the market 
declines relative to the perfect information outcome. In the latter case, sellers of low and 
high-quality houses receive a premium and discount for their goods, respectively. This 
outcome occurs because consumers in markets characterized by asymmetric information 
value goods at the expected value o f quality offered in the market. Both o f these 
examples are analogous to an illustration developed in Kreps (1990).
In the first example, asymmetric information drives high-quality goods out o f the 
market, resulting in the adverse selection o f low quality goods. Assume for simplicity 
that there are exactly two types o f houses in the market: high and low-quality. High- 
quality homes are valued at 5300,000 by consumers, while owmers value them at 
5250,000. Likewise, low-quality homes are valued at 5200,000 and 5100,000 by buyers
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and sellers, respectively. Secondly, assume that two out o f  ever}' three houses in the 
resale market are low-quality. In both examples, buyers are unable to identify quality; 
whereas, sellers are certain about the quality o f their goods. This assumption results in 
adverse selection influencing this market. Since consumers cannot identify qualit}', they 
value each house at the expected value of resale homes in the market. In this case, if both 
high and low-quality homes come to market, buyers are willing to pay $233,333.33, 
realizing there is a 66 percent chance of receiving a low-quality house. However, sellers 
o f  high-quality homes value their goods at $250,000. Sellers o f  high-quality homes are 
not willing to sell their goods at the prevailing market price. Consequently, high-quality 
sellers remove their goods from the market. Considering this, buyers readjust their 
willingness to pay to 5200,000, resulting in only low-quality houses being sold. In this 
example, low-quality houses drive out high-quality houses.
In the following case, both high and low-quality houses are sold. However, the 
presence of asymmetric information allows sellers o f  low-quality homes to receive a 
premium for their houses. The assumptions from the prior example apply, except in this 
illustration two out o f  every three houses in the resale market are high quality. In this 
case, as before, buyers are unable to identify quality. Again, consumer valuation is 
determined by the expected value o f houses offered for sale. Consumers are willing to 
pay 5266,666.66 for each house understanding there is a 33 percent chance they purchase 
a lemon. This market price exceeds high-quality sellers’ reservation price.
Consequently, both high and low-quality houses are sold in this market. 5ellers of high- 
quality homes, however, are penalized by the presence o f  asymmetric information. With
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
perfect information, sellers o f  high-quality homes would receive S300.000 for their goods 
which exceeds the S266.666.66 that results with asymmetric information.
These illustrations identify the potential for counteracting institutions and market 
signals to improve market results. Counteracting institutions include warranties, 
advertising, appraisal, and reputation, generally referred to in this study as certification. 
Owners opt to certify their house i f  the benefits o f certification exceed the costs. In the 
latter example, if  the price o f certification is less than 533,333.33, owners o f high-quality 
housing stock opt to certify their good; whereas, owners o f  low-quality products do not.
If this were the case, product certification would identify quality. Thus, certification 
identifies quality to consumers.
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CH-APTER 3
LITER.ATURE REVIEW 
Four areas o f the literature germane to this research include: (I)  the impacts of 
adverse selection and asymmetric information on market outcomes, (2) counteracting 
institutions that negate the adverse hindrances o f informational discrepancies. (3) hedonic 
pricing models, and (4) housing and resale housing market literature. This chapter 
summarizes these four areas.
Impacts o f  Adverse Selection and Asymmetric 
Information on Market Outcomes 
The impediments o f  asymmetric information on market outcomes are considered 
extensively in the literature, m ost notably by .Akerlof (1970), Genesove (1993), and 
Greemvald (1986).’ A kerlof (1970) pioneered the discussion o f  the hindrances o f adverse 
selection and asymmetric information on market outcomes. In markets influenced by 
asymmetric information, sellers are more informed than buyers about the quality of the 
good. Sellers gain valuable information about quality through consumption.
Accordingly, buyers pay a price equivalent to the expected value o f  all goods brought to
‘Other articles that consider adverse selection include: Bond (1982), Chezum and 
Wimmer (1997 and 2000), Conlin (1999), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Greenwald and 
Glasspiegel ( 1983), Heal ( 1976), Hey and McKenna (1981), Kim ( 1985), Lacko ( 1986), 
Lehn (1984), Smallwood and Conslik (1979). Stiglitz (1987), and W ilson (1977) and 
(1979).
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8market. Sellers offer their goods for sale as long as market price exceeds the benefits 
they receive from retaining their goods. Since the quality of the marginal good taken to 
market exceeds that o f  the average quality offered, owners o f high-quality goods may not 
find it optimal to take their goods to market. This removal o f  high-quality goods 
decreases the average quality o f goods being sold, decreasing market price, potentially 
driving sellers of medium-quality goods out o f the market. This pattern may persist until 
only low-quality products are sold. Consequently, in markets influenced by adverse 
selection, the quality o f the good sold and the number o f mutually beneficial trades tend 
to decrease.
Reduction in mutually beneficial trades is the result o f  an externality. Sellers o f  low- 
quality goods do not consider social welfare in their decision-making processes. Since 
sellers o f  low-quality goods take advantage o f  the market, the price that sellers o f high- 
quality goods receive declines. Reduction in the prices received by sellers of high-quality 
goods drives some o f  these sellers out o f the market. Externalities eliminate mutually 
beneficial trades that would occur with perfect information, resulting in inefficiencies.
Genesove (1993) suggests that asymmetric information does not necessarily result in 
market failure. Genesove argues that sellers may have reasons other than taking 
advantage o f the market to sell their good. Genesove notes that even when asymmetric 
information exists, sellers may find it in their interest to offer a portion o f  their goods for 
sale. He suggests capacity constraints may provide such a reason." If this is the case, 
both high and low-quality goods are brought to market. Also, if  consumers are able to
"Genesove considers the wholesale used car market in his analysis. In this example, the 
capacity constraint would be the size o f the new or used car lot.
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identify seller type by the value o f the good they bring to market, consumers’ willingness 
to pay will differ across seller types.
Greenwald (1986) examines the influence of adverse selection on the labor market.
He suggests employers discern the productivity o f their employees through supervision.
At the end o f each contracting period, employers opt to continue relations with their most 
productive employees, thus driving up the wage o f retained employees. The firm's desire 
to retain an employee signals high quality. This leads firms to offer wages that are 
sufficiently low to their least productive employees to force them to change occupations, 
results in a signal o f  low-quality in the secondhand labor market.
If  this was the only reason individuals changed occupations, then only unproductive 
employees would migrate between jobs. Migration in this case would provide an accurate 
signal o f quality to employers. Accordingly, future employers’ willingness to pay would 
fully reflect quality. This is not the case, however, since individuals may change 
occupations for other reasons. Asymmetric information imposes a constraint on both 
employers who hire fi-om the secondhand labor market and employees who desire to 
change occupations. Employers are imable to accurately identif}' the quality of migrating 
employees, so they value migrating employees at the expected productivity level o f the 
entire group. Consequently, the presence o f  low-quality employees depresses high- 
quality employees’ wages in this market. Employees migrating for reasons other than 
quality receive a lower wage than they would if information were perfect. Hence, 
asymmetric information limits the mobility o f labor, because employers cannot discern 
the productivity o f applicants in the secondhand labor market. This reduces high-quality
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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employees’ wages in future positions, thereby placing an impediment on their mobility 
within the labor market.
.An extensive literature review identified that prior consumption by one market 
participant creates an asymmetry o f  information. ' Existing literature provides support for 
a similar model in the resale housing market. In short, homeowners obtain information 
about the quality o f their houses through consumption, and this information is not 
available to prospective buyers. Consequently, market outcomes in the resale housing 
market should be hindered by adverse selection.
Counteracting Institutions 
.Akerlof (1970). Heal (1976), Shapiro (1982) and (1983), Spence (1973) and (1976), 
and Stigler (1961) discuss institutions that diminish the impacts o f  asymmetric 
information.^ In markets where asymmetric information is an impediment, adverse 
selection can force owners o f  high-quality goods out o f  the market. To avoid this 
outcome, owners o f high-quality goods attempt to signal quality. This signal may come in 
the form o f  advertising, warranties, producer’s reputation, and/or certification or 
appraisal. If successful, the price that producers o f high-quality goods command in the 
marketplace increases. Counteracting institutions potentially increase mutually beneficial 
transactions, thus decreasing welfare losses.
'Bond (1982), Genesove (1993), and Lacko (1986) consider the resale automobile market. 
Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) consider the market for slaves in nineteenth century 
America. Lehn (1984) considers the market for free agent baseball players. Chezum and 
Wimmer (1997 and 2000) consider the market for thoroughbred yearlings.
■*Other notable contributions to the literature include: Cooper and Ross (1984), Grossman
(1981), Heal ( 1976). Kerton and Bodell ( 1995), Klein and Leffler (1981), Leland ( 1979), 
Nelson (1970) and (1974), Schmalensee (1978), and Smallwood and Conslik (1979).
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Advertising improves market results when information about price, quality, and 
producers is not perfect. It helps identify buyers, sellers, price, and quality, thereby 
partially negating asymmetries in information that exist between buyers and sellers.
Stigler (1961) suggests advertising is effective at identifying buyers and sellers in a 
market. Search is costly if buyers and sellers cannot identify one another. Advertising 
reduces these costs by allowing buyers and sellers to identif}' themselves to one another. 
This identification reduces search costs and facilitates trade.
In the resale housing market, real estate agents advertise indirectly. By congregating 
buyers and sellers, real estate agents dramatically reduce the search costs o f  purchasing a 
home. This reduction in costs increases the number o f mutually beneficial trades that 
take place in this market, supporting the assertion that advertising plays a prominent role 
in the resale housing market.
Also, advertising in the form o f  brochures and publications provides information 
concerning a house’s directly observable attributes. Following Nelson (1974), advertising 
may be a signal o f quality provided by sellers of high-quality goods. Nelson (1974) 
suggests a good’s utility per dollar increases with advertising. Producers o f high-quality 
goods find it advantageous to identify quality through advertising. This result is driven 
by consumers’ uncertainty about quality. With perfect information, advertising increases 
production costs, impairing a firm ’s ability to compete. In contrast, when information is 
not perfect, producers o f  high quality products may find it in their best interest to identify 
superior quality through advertisement. Otherwise, consumers value quality at the 
expected value o f goods offered for sale in the market. Producers o f  high quality do not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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receive a price that is in accordance with their quality. Thus, advertising is one method 
for producers o f high-quality goods to identify themselves.
In addition, warranties, if feasible, identify a product’s quality. In most cases, 
however, complete warranties, which guarantee some level o f  quality, are not feasible 
because o f adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Spence (1976) and Shapiro
(1982) discuss the impacts that adverse selection and moral hazard have on the market for 
complete warranties. The theory o f moral hazard suggests individuals who possess a 
complete warranty take actions that increase the probability o f filing a claim. That is, the 
owner is careless with his or her product, taking risks he or she would not otherwise take 
without a warranty. This results in damages that would not occur without the complete 
warranty. Moral hazard makes complete warranties expensive and inefficient. Likewise, 
adverse selection hinders the market for complete warranties. Individuals who purchase 
complete warranties value them beyond their cost. These consumers have the highest 
expected claim costs. Thus, only the most careless individuals purchase complete 
warranties. This drives up the price o f complete warranties until the price drives all but 
the most careless individuals out o f  the market.
Spence (1976) suggests that complete warranties are effective only if  the sellers of 
warranties are certain about the quality o f  the product. If the seller is uncertain about 
quality, than complete warranties cannot eliminate buyer’s risk o f purchasing a lemon 
without placing substantial risk on the seller.
The presence of warranties in the resale housing market signals that asymmetric 
information may influence outcomes. However, a warranty’s effectiveness in eliminating
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
asymmetric information is impeded by adverse selection, moral hazard, and seller 
identity.
A seller's reputation factors importantly into reducing the hindrances o f  adverse 
selection on the resale housing market. Heal (1976) disputes A kerlof s (1970) claim that 
bad products drive out good. Heal suggests that as long as sellers are partially concerned 
about future sales it is not in their best interest to deceive consumers by selling low- 
quality products. As long as current gains o f  selling an inferior good do not exceed the 
present discounted value o f future gains from maintaining quality, high-quality goods are 
not driven out o f  the market. Thus, sellers consider their long-term relationships with 
their customers before selling low-quality products.
As suggested by Shapiro (1983), reputation is established over time. He suggests that 
in a competitive industry with imperfect information reputations allow price to exceed 
cost. If information is perfect, consumers value goods according to quality and they pay 
cost. When quality is uncertain, however, consumers are willing to pay a premium for 
products from sellers who have an established reputation for producing high-quality 
products. This premium represents a regular return for investment in reputation. Initially, 
high-quality goods sell for less than cost. This initial loss represents an investment in 
reputation. For producers to be willing to produce high quality, this investment in 
reputation makes a regular rate o f return. Consequently, consumers pay a premium above 
cost for goods from firms with established reputations. Moreover, it would seem that 
reputation would not alter the market for resale homes. Sellers enter this m arket
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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infrequently, elim inating incentives to build and maintain reputations o f selling high- 
quality products.
Despite this, reputation may indirectly affect the market for resale homes. Real estate 
agents may have incentives to build a reputation o f  selling high-quality resale homes. 
Agents who sell low-quality houses, exploiting transaction cost gains, may lose future 
customers. Consequently, agents may establish a reputation of selling high-quality 
housing. If this is the case, the real estate agents involved in a transaction m ay signal 
quality.
-Appraisal and certification reduce the impacts o f  adverse selection in the resale 
housing market. .Appraisal and certification occur when an expert assesses the quality o f 
a house. The appraiser, through direct inspection, reduces some uncertainty about 
quality. This reduction in uncertainty reduces the asymmetry in information between 
buyers and sellers in the resale housing market. Thus, if  certification and appraisal are 
effective, the m arket draws closer to the perfect information outcome.
Appraisal and certification do significantly impact the market for resale homes. It is 
commonplace in m ost resale housing markets for appraisal to be a necessary condition for 
a home to be sold. This activity identifies quality to both buyers and lenders.
Following Genesove (1993) and A kerlof (1970), the mere existence o f  counteracting 
institutions in the resale housing market indicates that asymmetric information probably 
exists. These institutions become profitable when there is a divergence in information 
between buyers and sellers. If these institutions are completely effective, the perfect 
information result w ill occur. However, it does not appear that these institutions will
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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effectively eliminate the asymmetry that exists between buyers and sellers in the resale 
housing market.
Hedonic Price Literature 
Rosen (1974) provides the seminal work concerning hedonic prices in which goods 
can be defined by a set o f  “n” objectively defined characteristics. Following Rosen's 
notation, a product 'z" with “n’' objectively identifiable characteristics can be defined as 
z = (z,. Zn. ..., z„) where z, measures the amount o f  the ith characteristic contained in 
each good. Consequently, “z" offers consumers different packages o f characteristics 
depending on their preferences, therefore. p(z) = p(Zj z?,..., z„ ). The price o f good “z"’ is 
determined explicitly by the combination o f the objectively measured characteristics. The 
implicit prices (also known as hedonic prices) o f  these characteristics can be estimated 
with regression analysis as follows:
p ( z )  =  B ,z ,  B c j  +  ...  -  B^^  -r e 
The coefficient B, for each regressor identifies the implicit price consumers are willing to 
pay for one more unit o f  each objectively identified characteristic.
This method has been utilized extensively in the housing market literature to identify 
such things as the value o f  environmental amenities as well as the value o f  insulation and 
comfort. Also, Benson et al. (1998) identify the value of a view in Bellingham, 
Washington. Through hedonic price estimation, Benson et al. quantify the value 
consumers place on different types o f views. Results indicate that an inverse relationship 
exists between distance and value o f a view.
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My study utilizes hedonic price estimation to determine whether or not an inverse 
relationship exists between price and the number o f times a house has been resold. Also, 
interaction terms are utilized to determine if this relationship varies with housing size.
Housing Market Literature
Smith et al. (1988) and Blank and W’innick (1953) provide distinguished overviews o f 
the housing market literature. These authors discuss several key housing market factors 
that contribute to this study. These include spatial fixity, housing stock heterogeneity, 
transaction costs and commuting costs, and housing stock durability.
Spatial fixity concerns the permanence o f housing location. Once built, relocation o f  
housing stock becomes prohibitively inefficient. This establishes geographical resale 
housing markets. Homeowners who decide to relocate enter the resale housing market as 
both buyer and seller, purchasing housing stock in the housing market they are moving to 
and selling their current housing stock.
Commuting costs frequently make relocation optimal. These costs include time and 
transportation costs, both o f  which increase directly with commuting distance. Indeed, 
over relatively short distances commuting costs can become significant. Commuting 
costs necessitate relocation if  a household decides to pursue occupational opportunities 
in a different geographic housing market. Thus, the housing stock consumption decision 
is centered upon occupation location.
Relocating costs manifest in transaction, search, moving, and psychic costs. 
Transaction costs include, but are not limited to, various closing, real estate agent, and
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legal fees. Search costs comprise the monetar>' expenses including time necessary to 
purchase housing stock. M oving costs include fees paid to move furniture and household 
appliances. Psychic costs include those associated with breaking community ties and 
having to forge new relationships. According to Smith et al. (1988), relocating costs have 
been estimated to be significant, ranging from 8 to 10 percent o f the house’s sales price.
Housing stock is considered a imique durable good. Its useful life, if  maintained 
properly, spans decades. Through proper maintenance, housing stock value can be 
maintained, and through rehabilitation existing housing stock can be increased. The 
importance o f maintenance and rehabilitation ties directly to the issue o f adverse selection 
in the resale housing market. Sellers are better aware o f  a house’s maintenance record. 
W ithout proper maintenance a house’s quality deteriorates. Since sellers are better 
informed about maintenance an asymmetry o f  information betw een buyers and sellers in 
the resale housing market exists.
Housing stock is heterogeneous. Houses comprised o f different levels o f amenities in 
different locations can be priced equally. This is best illustrated by Rosen’s (1974) 
hedonic price model. Each objectively identified amenity o f housing stock is valued by 
consumers.
Muth (1974) and Weinberg et al. (1981) consider the apparent immobility o f 
households. They suggest the imposition o f relocating costs is a significant deterrent to 
households’ relocating decision. Significant increases in economic variables, such as 
income and wealth, induce only modest increases in housing stock consumption.
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The asymmetric information costs suggested herein reinforce these authors’ findings. 
Sellers o f high-quality' houses face an asymmetric information cost of relocating. These 
sellers receive a market price that does not reflect quality. Consequently, owners o f high- 
quality houses may not find it optimal to increase housing stock consumption when faced 
with large increases in economic variables (e.g., income and wealth) resulting from the 
presence of asymmetric information in this market.
18
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CRAPTER 4
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
Akerlof (1970) pioneered the discussion o f the hindrances o f  adverse selection and 
asymmetric information on market outcomes. In markets influenced by asymmetric 
information, sellers are more informed than buyers about the quality o f the good. Sellers 
gain valuable information about quality through consumption. Accordingly, buyers pay a 
price equivalent to the expected value o f all goods brought to market. Sellers offer their 
goods for sale as long as market price exceeds the benefits they receive from retaining 
their goods. Since the quality o f the marginal good taken to market exceeds that o f the 
av erage quality offered, owners o f high-qualit>' goods may not find it optimal to take their 
goods to market. This removal o f high-quality goods decreases the average quality o f 
goods being sold, decreasing market price, potentially driving sellers o f medium-quality 
goods out o f  the market. This pattem may persist until only low-qualit}' products are 
sold. Consequently, in markets influenced by adverse selection, the quality o f the good 
sold and the number o f mutually beneficial trades tend to decrease.
Genesove (1993) suggests that asymmetric information does not necessarily result in 
market failure. Genesove argues that sellers may have reasons other than taking 
advantage o f the market to sell their good. Genesove notes that even when asymmetric 
information exists, sellers may find it in their interest to offer a  portion o f their goods for 
sale. He suggests capacity constraints may provide such a reason.^ If this is the case.
^Genesove considers the wholesale used car market in his analysis. In this example, the 
capacity constraint w ould be the size o f the new or used car lot.
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both high and low-quality goods are brought to market. .Also, if  consumers are able to 
identify seller t>pe by the value o f the good they bring to market, consumers willingness 
to pay will differ across seller types.
The focus o f this paper is to consider if  asymmetric information influences the resale 
housing market. First. I examine a household’s relocation decision under conditions of 
perfect information following Weinberg et al.(1981). These authors identify that 
households decide to relocate if  the benefits o f  relocation exceed costs. The significant 
transaction costs that are associated with relocation influence households' housing stock 
consumption decisions; suggesting households may consume a suboptimal level of 
housing stock in equilibrium. The model’s assumption o f  perfect information indicates 
expected quality in the resale housing market should be identical to the actual quality o f 
the universe o f housing stock.* Second, asymmetric information is introduced into 
households' relocation decisions. Assuming only two levels o f  quality exist in the market 
(high and low), owners o f  low-quality housing are more likely to relocate than in the case 
o f perfect information, whereas owners o f  high-quality are less likely. As illustrated in 
Genesove (1993), as long as households have reasons to sell their house other than just to 
take advantage o f the market, both high and low-quality houses are sold. If information is 
asymmetric, however, the average quality o f  homes in the resale market is lower than the 
average quality o f the universe o f  housing stock.
°With perfect information consumers are able to identify accurately the quality o f  a house. 
Thus, they are willing to pay for the quality they receive. The price sellers receive will be 
consistent with quality they are selling.
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Weinberg et al. (1981) formally develop a model o f the household’s relocation 
decision. Central to the relocation decision is the idea of ‘"compensating income 
variation- the maximum amount o f money that a household could spend on transaction 
costs (given the prevailing prices and income) and be as well o ff after the move as 
before”(334 1981). In short. IC quantifies the amount of money a household is willing to 
pay to optimize housing stock consumption, holding utility constant.
The benefits o f  relocation are not w ithout costs. According to Smith et al. (1988) 
households face significant relocating costs (RC). These costs manifest in transaction, 
moving, search, and psychic costs. The summation o f these costs identifies the overall 
relocating costs faced by households. This can be shown as
RC = f ( Z  S. M. P. a}. 
where RC is relocation costs, T is transaction costs, S is search costs, M is moving costs, 
P is psychic costs, and a  corresponds to all other remaining relocating costs.
A household’s relocation decision depends on both IC and RC. Generally, four 
potential other reasons households m ay decide to relocate are suggested herein. These 
include to change occupations, to take house price appreciation, to change 
neighborhoods, or to increase housing stock consumption as income or family size 
increases or decreases. Thus, if  IC is greater than RC. the household should relocate, 
otherwise they should not.
I posit another factor affecting the household relocation decision is asymmetric 
information between buyers and sellers as to the amenities o f a home. These information 
factors can be divided into two sets. The first set is considered observable, for example.
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square footage, presence of a pool, and number o f baths. The second set is factors not 
directly observ able; or, if observable, one might be expected to value these factors only 
after frequent observations. These factors are referred to as latent and include plumbing, 
wiring, foundation, environmental amenities, neighborhood amenities, and insulation. 
Therefore, since some latent home amenities are almost always present, asymmetric 
information is a common feature in the resale market. Homeowners, other things equal, 
more readily observe the quality o f their hom es’ latent amenities than potential buyers 
who are unable to observe the quality o f these amenities without incurring search and 
information costs.
Accounting for asymmetric information, IC can be decomposed into two components; 
OC and LC. OC measures the gains households receive from altering their consumption 
o f  observ able housing stock amenities. LC represents the gain or loss that households 
expect to receive from selling their home in a market influenced by asymmetric 
information. LC is the difference between the quality o f a household’s current 
consumption o f latent amenities and the quality o f latent amenities the household expects 
to receive when thev relocate."
If consumers are risk neutral, the value o f  LC is the difference between the quality o f a 
household’s current consumption o f latent amenities and the quality o f latent amenities 
the household expects to receive when they relocate. If consumers are risk averse LC is 
the difference between the quality o f current consumption of a household’s latent 
amenities and the certainty equivalent o f the expected value o f latent amenities brought to 
market. The certainty equivalent o f  the expected value o f latent amenities is the value of 
latent amenities the consumer would have to receive to be indifferent between a certain 
level o f  latent amenities and the expected value o f  latent amenities brought to market. If 
consumers are risk averse the magnitude o f  LCs will change but the signs will not.
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Households calculate their IC in each period and decide whether or not to relocate. I 
assume that OCs are randomly distributed among owners o f low' and high-quality housing 
stock. Furthermore, both buyers and sellers know the distribution o f  OCs, LCs, and the 
corresponding ICs. Households decide to relocate if  benefits exceed the costs.
To develop a benchmark, the effects o f quality on a household’s relocation decision 
are considered w hen information is perfect. In this setting. LC goes to zero. The price 
sellers receive reflects the quality o f their house exactly. Those households with OCs that 
exceed RC decide to relocate. OC* is defined as the minimum value o f OC necessary for 
homeowners to find relocation optimal. Assuming OCs are randomly distributed across 
owners o f high and low-quality houses, the average quality o f goods offered for sale is 
identical to the average quality o f houses in the overall market. Now consider when 
information is asymmetric. To simplify this discussion, I assume two levels o f  housing 
quality exist in the market: high and low quality. Also, potential buyers are aw are o f the 
distribution o f high and low-quality houses, but they are unable to observe the particular 
LC o f a home. If information is asymmetric, buyers pay according to the expected value 
o f houses brought to market.® Consequently, sellers o f low-quality houses receive a price 
that exceeds the value o f  their good; whereas, sellers o f  high-quality houses receive a 
price that is less than their hom e’s true value. That is, the LC for sellers o f  high-quality 
houses is negative, and the LC for sellers o f  low-quality houses is positive.
®I assume, following Genesove(1993), that ICs for some percentage o f owners o f  high- 
quality housing stock are large enough for them to enter the resale housing market that is 
influenced by asymmetric information.
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Households decide to relocate to maximize expected utilitv' if  IC exceeds RC or 
equivalently i f  the sum o f  OC and LC is greater than RC. Since LCs are positive for 
owners o f low-quality houses and negative for owners o f  high-quality houses, a greater 
proportion o f owners o f  low-quality housing stock find relocation optimal in each period 
compared to owners o f  high-quality housing stock. Since owners o f low-quality housing 
are more likely to take their goods to market than owners o f  high-quality houses, the 
expected value o f  houses in the resale market is less than the average quality o f the 
universe o f housing stock. Moreover, as the number o f  times that a house is resold 
increases, the likelihood that a house is o f low qualitv' should increase.
When information is asvmmetric, the market will clear at a price where the expected 
quality of goods offered for sale is identical to the actual quality offered for sale. At this 
price, both owners o f  high and low-quality housing stock offer their goods for sale. 
Assuming RC is constant for owners o f low and high-quality housing stock, the OC* for 
owners o f high-quality housing stock will be greater than the OC* for owners of low- 
quality housing stock. OC* is defined as the minimum value o f OC necessary for a 
household to relocate. Consequently, the resale housing market suffers from adverse 
selection, in that low-quality homes are more likely to be offered for sale than high- 
quality homes. The average quality o f homes in the resale market, in the case of 
asymmetric information, is less than the average quality in the resale housing market 
when information is perfect.
This relationship can be illustrated with an example. Consider the case where one 
hundred houses com e to market, fifty high-quality and fifty low-quality. Consumers
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value low-quality houses at S 180,000, and high-quality houses at 5200,000. If 
asymmetric information exists, consumers are willing to pay $190,000, thus LC is 
$10,000 for owners o f  low -quality houses and -510,000 for owners o f  high-quality 
houses. Consider the case when ten owners o f  low and high-quality housing stock have 
OCs of 540,000, twenty owners o f  low and high-quality housing stock have OCs o f 
$20.000, and the remaining owners have OCs o f  $10,000, where relocating costs equal 
$12,000. In this example, every owner of low-quality housing stock finds relocation 
optimal, but only the ten owners o f high-quality housing stock, with OCs o f $40,000, do 
so. Since a portion o f  owners o f  high-quality housing stock exit the market, low-quality 
houses are adversely selected reducing the market price to $183,333. When participants 
leave the market LCs also change, potentially driving all but the lowest-quality houses out 
o f  the market. However, the price o f $183,333 is an equilibrium in this example since 
actual quality brought to market equals expected quality. So, ten owners o f high-quality 
housing stock and fifty owners o f  low-quality housing stock still decide to relocate. The 
following table illustrates the relocation decision o f  each market participant discussed in 
this section.
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An Illustrative Example o f the Influence o f 
Quality on a Household’s Relocation Decision
Housing
Stock
Owner
No. o f 
Homes
LC OC RC OC ^  LC > RC Relocate
Decision
Low-
quality
10 -510,000 540.000 512,000 518.000 Yes
20 -510,000 520,000 512,000 -52.000 No
20 -510,000 510.000 512,000 -512,000 No
High
quality
10 510.000 540.000 512.000 538.000 Yes
20 510,000 520,000 512,000 518,000 Yes
20 510,000 510,000 512,000 510,000 Yes
This analysis shows that the resale housing market can be divided into separate sub- 
markets where average quality differs based on a home's resale history. The price 
consumers are willing to pay for homes is different in each o f  these markets, holding 
other things constant. Thus, price should be decreasing in the number o f  times a house is 
resold.
I have shown that when asymmetric information influences the resale housing market, 
the average quality o f homes offered for sale is lower than the average for the over all 
housing stock. This analysis could be replicated for houses that have been sold once, 
producing similar outcomes. In this case, houses sold twice would be o f  a lower average 
quality than those only sold once. Similarly, houses that have not been resold would be 
o f a higher average quality than those sold once.
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The challenge is to identify a way to measure whether or not adverse selection affects 
the market for resale homes. Genesove (1993) suggests if  consumers are able to 
differentiate seller type by the level o f  quality they bring to market, we expect to see 
consumer’s willingness to pay to be different across types o f  sellers. In the resale housing 
market, one measure that could identify type of seller is the number o f a times a house has 
been resold. Turnover measures offer a test for the presence o f  adverse selection in the 
resale housing market. As a house’s turnover rate increases, holding other things constant, 
consumer’s willingness to pay should decrease.
This result, however, depends on the efficiency o f  counteracting institutions in 
relieving the asymmetry o f information in this market. In markets affected by asymmetric 
information, incentives arise for third parties to provide counteracting institutions to 
improve market results. Counteracting institutions include warranties, advertising, 
appraisal, and reputation, generally referred to in this study as certification. Owners opt 
to certify their house if  the benefits o f  certification exceed the costs. Owners of high- 
quality houses may find certification optimal since market price is not consistent with the 
value o f their home. If only two levels o f quality (high and low) exist, only owners of 
high-quality' houses would consider certification. If only owners o f high quality certify, 
the premium sellers o f low-quality housing stock receive from selling their home would 
be eliminated. However, if  the cost o f certification is prohibitive, asymmetric 
information still affects outcomes in this market.
Risk aversion increases the demand for certification on the buyer’s side. Risk averse 
consumers are w illing to pay a premium to avoid an actuarially fair gamble. This
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premium is commonly referred to as the risk premium. The purchase o f latent amenities 
in the resale housing market can be considered a gamble since there is uncertainty in the 
quality that will be received. To simplify, I continue to examine the case when only two 
levels o f  quality exist in the market: high and low. If quality is uncertain consumers will 
purchase either high-quality latent amenities with a probability cf rj  and low-quality latent 
amenities with a probability o f l-ry. A risk averse consumer is willing to pay a premium 
to avoid the uncertainty that exists when qualitv' is uncertain.
If the value o f  latent amenities is increasing in investment size, so is the risk premium 
consumers are willing to pay for certainty. The risk premium that consumers are willing 
to pay is directly related to the variance of the uncertain outcome. As the value of latent 
amenities increase so will the variance o f the uncertain outcome. Thus, the risk premium 
that consumers are willing to pay to avoid this gamble should be increasing in investment 
size. Consumer’s risk premium directly affects sellers’ willingness to pay for 
certification. The value o f certification is increasing in the size o f  the risk premium.
If the utilization o f certification increases with investment size, 1 would expect the 
relationship between price and turnover rate to erode with investment size. That is to say: 
c  (â LNPrice /  â  Turnover Rate)/à  Turnover Rate>0.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA AND MODEL 
A data set o f  1,048 resale housing market transactions drawn from the Clark County 
Assessor’s database was collected from the area o f  Clark County, Nevada for transactions 
occurring in October o f  1999. This data set consists o f  information on sales price and 
housing characteristics for each transaction, including data on number o f bedrooms, 
number o f  bathrooms, square footage, number o f  fireplaces, presence o f pool, housing 
type, and year o f  first sale. These data also identify the address for each house being 
resold. In addition, data were also collected from the Clark County Assessor’s Website 
(http://www.co.clark.nv.us/assessor). Each observation’s resale history was also 
collected from this source.
The data set includes one dependent variable and three categories o f independent 
variables. The dependent variable is Price, where Price is the sales price for resale 
homes transacted in Clark County, Nevada, during October o f  1999. The categories o f 
independent variables include Observable Amenities, Community-, and Latent Amenity 
Proxy variables. A complete description o f each o f my variables and their expected signs 
is provided in Table 2 in Appendix I.
In order to hold constant for each observation’s objectively identifiable manifest 
amenities a set o f  Observable Amenity’ variables are included. These variables include
29
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Age. .Acreage, Average Room Size. Bath, Fire, Pool, One-story, and Square Footage.
Age is the difference between the year o f  transaction and the year o f first sale. As with 
most durable goods a direct relationship between age and depreciation is expected. 
Average Room Size was calculated by taking the quotient o f square footage and the 
number o f bedrooms. Bath and Fire identify the number o f bathrooms and fireplaces for 
each observation, respectively. Indicator variables include Pool, and One-Story’, which 
are set equal to one if  the house has the amenity, and zero otherwise. The variable Square 
Footage is the number o f living square feet.
Community’ variables identify the importance o f location in the valuation o f  housing 
stock. To capture location’s importance, eight regional dummy variables o f the Clark 
County area are introduced: Downtown, East, Henderson, Northeast. Northwest, South, 
Southwest, and Summerlin. These regions were developed by considering commercially 
available print publications from real estate agents in Clark County, Nevada.
Finally, the Latent Amenity Proxy variable identifies if  asymmetric information 
influences the resale housing market. This variable is Turnover Rate. Turnover Rate 
equals the number o f times each observation has been sold (not including initial sale) 
divided by its age.
Appendix I, Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables. In aggregate, the 
sample’s mean sales price is 5149,891 with a standard deviation o f 578,581. The mean 
square footage is 1,775.81 with a standard deviation o f 696.61. Furthermore, the average 
turnover rate is 0.2756 per year with a standard deviation o f 0.3042.
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Box-Cox estimation was utilized to identify the appropriate transformation of the 
dependent variable. The Box-Cox transform identifies the logarithmic functional form to 
be the appropriate specification for this data set. Box-Cox is a maximum likelihood 
iterative estimation technique that permits identification o f the transform that provides the 
best fit for the data set. The Box-Cox transform equation is;
y'^ = ry^- 7>/X
Lambda equal to one, zero, and negative one identify linear, logarithmic, and reciprocal 
functional form specifications, respectively. The lambda calculated for this hedonic 
equation equaled -0.1734 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from -0.0988 to 
-0.2383. This suggests that the logaritfimic transformation o f the dependent variable is 
appropriate one among the three most frequently used transforms for this data set. 
Consequently, LNPrice is utilized as the dependent variable, where LNPrice is the natural 
log o f sales price for homes transacted in Clark County, Nevada during October o f 1999.’ 
The Ramsey Reset test (regression specification error test) is utilized to determine the 
appropriate transformation o f variables. The Ramsey Reset test {Reset) is a general test 
that tests for omitted variables, incorrect functional form, and violations o f  the 
assumptions o f  ordinary least squares. The null hypothesis for this test is that the model 
is correctly specified. Conversely, the alternative hypothesis is that the model is 
incorrectly specified. Reset tests for omitted variables and functional form 
misspecification by re-estimating the model including the powers o f  the fitted values o f
’The natural log transformation o f price is consistent with a priori expectations. This 
transformation ensures that all predicted values will be positive. Since the model predicts 
values o f price this constraint seems appropriate.
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the dependent variable from the nested model. If  the powers o f  the fitted values do not 
significantly improve the goodness o f  fit the null hypothesis should be accepted, 
identifying that the model is adequately specified. Two specifications o f  these data that 
allowed the null hypothesis to be accepted at conventional levels are utilized to test the 
hypothesis that price is decreasing in the num ber o f times a house is resold. These 
specifications which are referred to as Quadratic include the following set o f  independent 
variables: Latent Amenity Proxy, Age, Acreage, Average Room Size, Bath, Fire, Pool, 
One-story. Square Footage, and Square Footage^. One specification includes Community 
variables, the other does not.
To determine if  the relationship between price and the number o f  times a house is 
resold is robust, several other specifications were tested. These include specifications for 
which Square Footage is included linearly and logarithmically {double-log). The 
double-log is reported in addition to quadratic specification and includes Age, Bath, Fire, 
LNAcreage, LNAverage Room Size, LNSquare Footage, Pool, and One-story as the set of 
Observable Amenity variables, where LNAcreage, LNAverage Room Size, and LNSquare 
Footage are the natural logs o î Acreage, Average Room Size, Square Footage, 
respectively.
Utilizing these data, two hedonic price models are estimated to determine i f  
asymmetric information influences the resale housing market. The hedonic pricing model 
equation is.
10The Reset tests’ null hypothesis was rejected in both of these specifications.
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Above, I have argued that sellers may employ certification to address problems o f  
asymmetric information. The most direct way to test such an hypothesis is to obtain 
information on whether or not such a mechanism is employed. These data unfortunately 
could not be collected to include these variables directly. However, I expect the value o f 
certification to be increasing in the size o f  the home. An indirect test for the utilization o f 
certification is to examine whether the relationship between price and turnover rates 
varies with housing size. Thus, from Equation 1.
B,Latent Amenity Proxy = f  (Square Footage)
To test this hypothesis, a second Latent Amenity Proxy variable that interacts 
Turnover Rate with LNSquare Footage is included in the double-log specification to 
consider the relationship between price and the number o f times a house has been resold 
as square footage changes.” Expanded from Equation 1:
LNPrice = Bg + B ,Observable Amenities + B^Community + ^
(B^ -i- BjLNSquare Footage) Turnover Rate e
Further,
LNPrice = Bg + B ,Observable Amenities + BnCommunity> 
B^Latent Amenity’ Proxy + e (Eq. I)
” The double-log transform was utilized to model the relationship between price and 
turnover as square footage changes since it is a parsimonious model, consistent with 
economic theory, that takes into account the nonlinearities between price and square 
footage present in the data.
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LNPrice = + B .Observable Amenities + B -Community’ ^
■ B  ^ Turnover Rate+ BJLNSquareFootage * Turnover Rate + e
The partial deriv ative o f LNPrice with respect to Turnover Rate identifies the relationship 
between price and turnover rate for different sizes o f  housing stock, which is:
c  LNPrice /  â  Turnover Rate = B3 B4LNSquare Footage (Eq. 4)
I expect that an increase in a house’s turnover rate should decrease consumer’s 
willingness to pay for that house, holding other things constant, and this relationship may 
erode as the size o f investment increases if  the value o f certification is increasing in size 
o f investment or mathematically â  (o LNPrice /  c  Turnover Rate)/â Turnover Rate is 
positive.
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CH.APTER 6
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 in Appendix I include empirical results. Table 3 shows the findings 
for two regression equations that correspond to the quadratic specification in which 
Turnover Rate is the only Latent Amenity Proxy variable introduced. Table 4 illustrates 
the results o f  two regression equations that correspond to the double-log specification in 
which Turnover Rate is the only Latent Amenity’ Proxy’ variable introduced. Table 5 
includes two regression equations that correspond to the double-log specification for 
which both Turnover Rate and Turnover Rate *LNSquare Footage are included as Latent 
Amenity’ Proxy variables. Column 1, in each table, does not include Community 
variables, whereas column 2 does.'*
Empirical results reinforce expectations for Observable Amenities and Community’ 
variables. That is. manifest amenities and location appear to influence housing price.
The variables Age, Average Room Size, Fire. LN.Acreage. LNAverage Room Size, 
LNSquare Footage, Pool, One-Story, Square Footage, Square Footage' are statistically 
significant in each regression equation for which they are included. Also, Northwest, 
Northeast, Central. East, and Southwest are statistically significant in each equation for
‘“Results o f  regression equations for which Square Footage was entered linearly were 
provided results similar to that o f  the quadratic and double-log  models.
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which they are included. Northwest, Northeast. Central, East each have a negative 
coefficient, whereas Southwest has a positive coefficient. Acreage, South, and Summerlin 
are not statistically different from zero in any regression equation in which they enter.
The Latent Amenity Proxy variables are o f  interest to my model. In the quadratic 
regression equation that does not include Community’ variables, the Turnover Rate 
coefficient is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. In the double-log regression 
equation that does not include Community’ variables, the Turnover Rate coefficient is 
negative and has a p-value o f  .112, indicating an inverse relationship exists between 
turnover rates and price. However, this variable, while remaining negative, becomes 
insignificant when Community variables are included. The p-value for Turnover Rate 
drops to 0.246 and 0.686 for the quadratic and double-log  specifications respectively.
Although these results are consistent with expectations that a relationship exists 
between price and turnover rates, I believe that this form o f  the model does not capture 
fully this relationship. Variables that should be included to fully capture these data 
include differences in demographics across regions, the uncertainties about quality that 
may decrease in established neighborhoods, and the presence o f counteracting 
institutions.'" Although data were not collected for these variables, below I test indirectly
'"Central to my argument is that consumers are uncertain about quality in the resale 
housing market. To test i f  perceptions o f turnover rates are different in more established 
parts o f  towns or in regions with larger concentrations o f  minority households, the two 
oldest regions in the data set were omitted. These regions are also relatively concentrated 
with minority households. When these regions are omitted, the coefficient on Turnover 
Rate, when Community variables are included, becomes statistically significant.
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for the influences o f  counteracting institutions on the resale housing market.
Also of interest are the regression results that include Turnover Rate HNSquare 
Footage as a second Latent Amenity’ Proxy’ variable. The coefficients for each Latent 
Amenity Proxy’ variable in these equations is statistically significant. This regression 
indicates the relationship between price and turnover rate varies w ith housing size. The 
partial derivative o f  LNPrice with respect to Turnover Rate  is negative up to 2,050 square 
feet and positive thereafter in the regression that does not include Community’ variables, 
spanning over approximately 80 percent o f  the data set. This partial derivative is negative 
up to 1,820 square feet and positive there after in the regression that includes Community 
variables. A 95 percent confidence interval was estimated for this partial derivative. This 
confidence interval identified that this partial derivative is statistically less than zero for 
houses less than 1700 square feet, not statistically different from zero for houses ranging 
from 1700 to 2900 square feet, and positive for houses greater than 2900 square feet in 
the regression equation that does not include community variables. Further, this 
confidence interval identified that this partial derivative is statistically less than zero for 
houses less than 1500 square feet, not statistically different from zero for houses ranging 
from 1500 to 2300 square feet, and positive for houses greater than 2300 square feet in 
the regression equation that does include commimity variables. Figures 2 and 3 in 
Appendix I plot the relationship between price and turnover as square footage changes for 
each regression equation.
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In general, my results are consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric information 
influences the resale housing market. An increase in a house’s turnover rate decreases 
consumer’s willingness to pay for that house, other thing constant. Further, it has been 
shown that this relationship depends on housing size. Depending on the value of 
certification, owners o f high-quality housing stock may certify their goods in order to 
signal quality. As investment increases, consumers may be willing to pay a premium for 
housing stock that is identified to be o f high quality. Thus, the relationship between 
turnover rates and price is increasing in housing size.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CH.XPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
The presence o f asymmetric information in the resale housing market appears to 
influence market outcomes. Owners acquire information through consumption that 
buyers do not, creating an asymmetry in information. Since owners o f  low-quality houses 
gain more from relocation than owners o f high-quality houses; the expected quality o f 
houses on the market is lower than the expected quality o f the aggregate stock o f houses. 
Moreover, as the number o f  times that a house is put on the market increases, the 
likelihood that a house is o f  low-quality increases. Thus, the expected quality of houses 
offered for sale is decreasing in the number of times they are resold. My results suggest 
an inverse relationship exists between price and the number o f times houses are resold, 
which is consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric information influences outcomes 
in the resale housing market. This result provides several valuable insights into the 
housing market literature.
My results may provide another explanation for the household immobility presented 
by Weinberg et al. (1981). Transaction costs impede the relocation decision of 
households. As transaction costs increase, few er households relocate. In addition, the 
presence of asymmetric information also assesses a cost to relocating households. When 
asymmetric information exists between market participants, the less-informed market
39
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participant pays a price consistent with expected value o f  houses offered for sale. Thus, 
the price that owners o f high-quality housing stock receive is depressed. This externality 
reduces mutually beneficial trades in the resale housing market, thus reducing the number 
o f  households that find relocation optimal. Although transaction costs are the primary' 
explanation for household immobility, the presence o f  asymmetric information appears to 
be a valid extension.
Future research should attempt to identify both the importance o f counteracting 
institutions in the resale housing market and the primary reason sellers relocate. Data on 
individuals and why they move or where they move to would be helpful. This 
information may be available to consumers at the time o f purchase, thereby altering their 
willingness to pay. Further, data from another geographical housing market should be 
collected and a similar test be constructed. In addition, Clark County's dynamic housing 
market may not be descriptive o f  less robust markets. This hypothesis may be better 
supported by data collected in a more established geographical housing market. These 
data could possibly be collected via Metroscan and local county assessors’ offices. Also, 
variables more capable o f identifying the intricacies o f  neighborhood characteristics 
should be included.
Another extension to this theory would include the number o f  days a house is on the 
market as the dependent variable while maintaining the same independent variables.
One potentially credible signal is to forego the benefits o f  m oving by refusing offers that 
are not consistent with value. Since sellers of low-quality hom es are expected to receive 
a premium for selling their homes; such a signal is likely to be prohibitively costly for
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them. Thus, owners o f high-quality housing stock can signal quality to the market by- 
leaving their house on the market until the price they receive more closely reflects quality. 
So, an inverse relationship between days on the market and turnover rates should exist, 
other things constant. Since owners o f  low-quality housing stock are receiving a price 
that exceeds value, if  asymmetric information exists they are more likely to accept offers 
than are owners o f high-quality' housing. This hypothesis could be tested with a hazard 
rate model.
In any case, the presence o f asymmetric information in the resale housing market 
appears to affect outcomes. As a house’s turnover rate increases, consumers reduce their 
willingness to pay for that home, other things constant. This relationship also varies with 
investment size. Risk averse consumers willingness to pay for certification increases with 
investment size. My empirics are consistent with this hypothesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX I
TABLES AND FIGURES
42
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Coefficient Expectations
43
Variable Name Description Expected
Sign
D ependent Variable
Price The sales pnce o f a subset o f  houses transacted in Clark County, 
Nevada dunng October o f  1999.
N/A
LN Price Natural log o f  Price. N7A
Latent A m enity  P roxy Variables that attempt to identify if  a relationship exists between 
pnce and the number o f  times a house has been resold.
N/A
Turnover Rale Equals the number o f  times sold, not including initial sale, 
divided by age.
Positive/
Negative
Turnover Rate  '  
LM Square Footage
Turnover Rate  multiplied by LN Square Footage. Positive/
Negative
O bservable A m enities Includes all independent variables consumers are able to identify 
and accurately value during their search process.
N/A
Acreage Size, in acres, on which the house resides. Positive
A ge Difference between 1999 (transaction year) and the year o f  first 
sale.
Negative
Average Room  Size Produced by dividing living square feet by number o f bedrooms. Positive
Bath Number o f  bathrooms in the house. Positive
F ire Number o f  fireplaces the house possesses. Positive
LN A creage The natural log o f size, in acres, on which the house resides. Positive
LN A verage Room  S ize The natural log o f the quotient o f  square feet and number o f  
bedrooms.
Positive
LN Square Footage Number o f  total living square feet for each house. Positive
O ne-Story Dummy variable that identifies if  a house is one or two stories. 
This variable takes the value o f  one if the house is one story and 
0 is the house is two stories.
Positiv'e
P ool Dummy variable that identifies the presence o f a pool. This 
variable takes on the value o f  1 if  a pool is present and 0 i f  a 
pool is not present.
Positive
Square Footage Number o f  total living square feet. Positivée
Square Footager Number o f  total living square feet squared. Negative
C om m unity Regional dummy variables that attempt to quantify the value o f  
location in the price o f  housing stock.
N/A
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Table 1 (continued)
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Downtown This variable takes on the value o f  I if  the house resides in zip  
codes 89101,89102, 89104,89106.89107 and 0 otherwise.
Positive
Negative
East This variable takes on the value o f  1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89121. 89120. 89109, 89122 and 0 otherwise.
Positive
Negative
H enderson This variable takes on the value o f  1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89012. 89014. 89015 and 0 otherwise.
Positive/
Negative
N ortheast This variable takes on the value o f  1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89115, 89110, 89030. 89031 and 0 otherwise.
Positive/
Negative
N orthw est This variable takes on the value o f 1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89130, 89131. 89108 and 0 otherwise.
Positive/
Neganve
South This variable takes on the value o f  1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89119 and 89123 and 0 otherwise.
Positive/
Negative
Southw est This variable takes on the value o f  1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89103. 89113. 8 9 II7, 89118 and0 otherwise.
Positive/
Negative
Sum m erlin This variable takes on the value o f 1 if  the house resides in zip 
codes 89128. 89129. 89134 and 0 otherwise.
Positive/
Negative
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics*
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation
L N P rice 11.83 0.393
Turnover Rate 0.276 0.304
Turnover R ate  '  LN Square  
F ootage
2.0612 2.2967
A creage 0.188 0.545
A g e 14.810 13.062
A verage Room 534.69 153.43
B ath 1.9519 .5387
F ire 0.801 0.642
L N  A creage -1.887 0.4711
LNA verage Room  Size 6.2461 0.2608
LN Square F ootage 7.418 0.346
O ne-Story 0.679 0.467
P ool 0.2145 0.411
Square F ootage 1.7-75.815 696.616
Square Footage^ 3,638.335 3.492.630
D ow ntow n 0.138 0.345
E a st 0.089 0.2859
H enderson 0.168 0.374
N ortheast 0.155 0.362
N orthw est 0.108 0.310
South 0.063 0.243
Southw est 0.099 0.299
Sum m erlin 0.179 0.384
*Number o f  observations used was 1,048.
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Table 3. Two Regression Equations That Include Turnover Rate as the Only Latent Amenity Proxy
Variable (quadratic specification). T-statistics using white standard errors in parentheses.
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Variable LNPrice LN P rice
{Community’)
Constant 10.863*** 10.9278***
(210.021) (206.622)
Turnover Rate -0.030** -0.0149
(-2.279) (-1.160)
A ge -0.0083*** -0.0071***
(-15.089) (-10.920)
A creage 0.0158 0.0149
(1.167) (1.041)
A verage Room 0.0005*** 0.0004***
(6.504) (5.619)
Bath 0.0044 0.0097
(0.299) (0.673)
Fire 0.0287*** 0.0107**
(2.609) (2.102)
One-Ston- 0.0635*** 0.0726***
(4.978) (5.923)
P ool 0.0899*** 0.0901***
(6.289) (6.351)
Square Footage 0.00047*** 0.0004***
(15.230) (14.366)
Square Footage- -2.70E-08*** -2.19E-08***
(-4.919) (-3.820)
Downtown -0.615***
(-2.975)
E ast -0.0631***
(-2.828)
Northeast -0.1311***
(-7.729)
N orthw est -0.0412**
(-2.429)
South 0.0057
(0.318)
Southwest 0.0447**
(2.222)
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Table 3 (continued)
Sum m erlin 0.0195
(1.227)
Number o f  Observations 1048 1048
R-squared 0.8353 0.8510
F-statistic 343.07 225.82
Note; Henderson excluded regional dummy variable. 
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 4: Two Regression Equations That Include Turnover Rate as the Only Latent Am enity Proxy
Vanable {double-log specification). T-statistics using white standard errors in parentheses.
Variable LN P rice L N P rice
{C om m unity)
C onstant 5.8813*** 6.397***
(18.902) (20.296)
Turnover Rate -0.0176 -0.00047
(-1.190) (-0.032)
A ge -0.0081*** -0.0071***
(-13.899) (-10.513)
Bath 0.0241 0.0318**
(1 562) (2.094)
LN A creage 0.1038*** 0.1129***
(4.022) (4.255)
LN A verage Room 0.2821*** .2389***
(7.629) (6.583)
Fire 0.03519*** 0.0324***
(3.196) (2.961)
LN Square Footage 0.5908*** 0.5682***
(16.532) (16.10)
O ne-Storv 0.0434*** 0.0513***
(2.795) (3.386)
P ool 0.0922*** 0.0931***
(6.362) (6.397)
D ow ntow n -0.052***
(-2.437)
E ast -0.0643***
(-2.913)
N ortheast -0.1285***
(-7.451)
N orthw est -0.0539***
(-3.104)
South -0.0192
(-1-114)
Southw est 0.0478**
(2.261)
Sum m erlin 0.0224
(1.401)
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Table 4 (continued)
Number o f Observations 1048 1048
R-squared 0.8287 0.8442
F-statistic 335.83 211.52
Note: Henderson excluded regional dummy variable. 
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 5. Two Regression Equations Including Both Turnover Rate and Turnover Rate •LNSquareFootage
as Latent Amenity Proxy Variables {double-log specification). T-statistics using white standard errors in
parentheses.
Variable LN P rice LN P rice
{Community)
C onstant 6.145***
(19.302)
6.601***
(20.876)
Turnover Rate -1.113***
(-3.211)
-1.110***
(-3.423)
Turnover R ate * LN Square  
Footage
0.1460***
(3.151)
0.148***
(3.393)
LN Acreage 0.0982***
(3.824)
0.107***
(4.065)
A ge -0.0082***
(-14.241)
-0.0073***
(-10.873)
LNA verage Room 0.2809***
(7.964)
0.2381***
(6.590)
Bath 0.0213
(1.401)
0.02900**
(1.942)
Fire 0.0346***
(3.074)
0.0311***
(2.837)
LNSquare Footage 0.5559***
(14.944)
0.5323***
(14.449)
O ne-Story 0.0436***
(2.843)
0.0514***
(3.433)
P ool 0.0942***
(6.459)
0.0951***
(6.514)
D owntown -0.053***
(-2.479)
East -.0651***
(-2.992)
N ortheast -0.1302***
(-7.520)
N orthw est -0.0555***
(-3.182)
South -0.0211
(-1.231)
Southw est 0.0471**
(2.226)
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Table 5 (continued)
Sum m erlin 0.0196
(1.215)
Number o f Observations 1048 1048
R-squared 0.8301 0.8457
F-Statistic 320.86 213.85
Note: Henderson excluded regional dummy variable. 
* Significant at 10% level.
** Significant at 5% level.
*** Significant at 1% level.
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Figure 1. Relationship Between LNPrice and Turnover Rate Over the Relevant Range 
of Square Footage (no Community variables).
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Figure 2. Relationship Between LNPrice and Turnover Rate Over the Relevant Range 
o f Square Footage (with Community variables).
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